5; Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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Senegal had never in fact been free from elements of racism, though such a policy was never officially countenanced until the Vichy regime. Geoffrey Gorer found many instances of discrimination in Dakar, and actually went as far as to say that 'The colour bar is extremely strong in Dakar'. But he concluded 'these French citizens are far happier than their brother French Negro subjects; if they are too badly cheated or abused they have some redress in the law courts'. The colour bar was certainly not official policy then as it became under the Vichy Administration.

The Vichy regime marks the end of an era in West Africa and particularly in Senegal. Until 1940 there had been little or no opposition to French assimilationist policy by the Africans. Indeed they were the first to criticise any deviations from it. Blaise Diagne enjoyed high status in France, and though he was accused by his critics of corruption and of selling himself to the French he remained the popular choice in Senegal until his death.

At the ensuing election Galandou Diouf defeated Blaise Diagne's old opponent, Lamine Guèye, who was instrumental in the formation of the Senegalese branch of the *S.F.I.O.* Hitherto elections had been largely fought on the basis of personal followings, with the exception of the European-dominated *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* founded in 1929 in which Europeans played a prominent role. Not only was Lamine Guèye the first Senegalese to realise the value of the party machine, but he was also the first to advocate the granting of full political and legal rights to all French Africans. Significantly he did not suggest any form of break with France, rather that France should carry her assimilationist policy to its logical conclusions. In 1939 he increased his political backing considerably when the *P.S.S.* fused with his section of the *S.F.I.O.* and this was to make him a leading member of the party in the metropolis as well as in Senegal.

However the younger generation of Senegalese were

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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665 [369] [666] this shift. Such demonstrations revealed the intense hostility between the two main parties. This deeply influenced urban life, in the realms that overlapped into the specifically political domain.

Some indications have been given as to the significance of party membership. They can be supplemented by approaching the problem somewhat differently. To a considerable degree, the parties remained closely associated with the "clienteles" that typified pre-war political life. This trait appeared most clearly in the party in power, the one that controlled the city government. To maintain and increase such a political clientele, the party had [669] access to very important instruments. Through the numerous municipal employees and all others who depended upon city hall, or who directly or indirectly benefited from its aid or its support, it extended a very wide network of influence. This was elaborated by the other network of influence, comprising the traditionally influential individuals, who were partly interwoven into it.[37] If a party had such a basis its dynamic force dropped considerably, and the role of its leaders assumed major importance. The prestige of the leader was essential to the cohesion of the political groups. This fact came out clearly in various researches. For instance, in the course of over 100 interviews it appeared that there were wide gaps between the official orientation of the party to which the respondent belonged and the political goals that he expressed.[38] Adherence to the leader overcame that difference to some extent. A certain formalization of partisan attachment thus appeared, in a primitive fashion. The importance of the leader's prestige was revealed with the greatest clarity in relation to the feminine clientele of the parties. It must be emphasized that at Dakar, at least among the [369]

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665 tems. At Dakar, the powers of the "*sé-*
[633] *rigne*" and of the dignitaries of the former "Lebou Republic" were continued, although they gradually lost their importance.[40] The parties were careful to keep these leading figures among their clientele. As a result there were some rather complex manipulations concerning nominations and succession. A nomination accepted by one party was more or less openly contested by the other. Hence the relatively frequent bifurcation of power: opposing the dignitary who had received official recognition was another who maintained himself as pretender, with the support of the party that had backed his candidacy. Such events stood
• [667] out even more sharply among ward leaders, who depended most directly upon the party that controlled the city government. Their support was more or less confined to the voters of this party. Hence certain wards had clandestine ward leaders, around whom the members of the opposition party could gather. Of course, such phenomena have accelerated the deterioration of these institutions.

793 (2) In the religious field, control over
665 chiefs of the great Moslem brotherhoods similarly has been at stake in intense struggles between the parties. This was particularly true of the main brotherhood in Senegal, that of the Tidjanes.
[369] This problem has been centered outside Dakar and the other coastal cities, but has had important repercussions in these cities. The rivalries that apparently have always surrounded the choice of the caliph of the Tidjanes were intensified and acquired a greater impact, in proportion as the fundamental hostility of the parties was openly associated with
[788] them. Violent incidents involving political enemies occurred even on pilgrimages to Tivaouane, where the caliph resides; they contributed to the prolongation of conflicts within the caliph's family. Well-meaning interference by re-

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467 In 1954 it had a membership about 100,-
000, or a little less than one-third of all
wage-earners. The unions have reached
[369] their greatest development in Senegal,
especially in the large cities. In 1954
this territory contained more than half
the union members in French West
Africa, more than a third of all Sene-
galese wage-earners. Dakar has a central
role in this field. It is the headquarters
for the largest unions, which were once
affiliated with French federations but
are now autonomous. Dakar also pos-
sesses a very active "Labor Exchange."
By itself it contains more than two-fifths
of the union members in Senegal.

467 To some extent the significance of
668 the unions is more than occupational
• [667] and economic. The degree to which they
complete the political machinery of the
[665] city is suggested by a comparison of the
percentages of party memberships with
the percentages of union memberships.
Of 1,200 persons interrogated during the
Dakar survey noted above, about one-
half (52 per cent) stated they were
union members. The potential ambiguity
of such statements was suggested above
in connection with political parties.[48]
However, an analysis of the respondents
by socio-occupational categories gave
meaningful results. The average rate of
union membership was surpassed by
lower-ranking office-workers and govern-
ment employees, higher-ranking office-
workers and government employees, and
professional people; it was equalled by
semi-skilled workers. With the exception
[665] of the first, these are precisely the cate-
gories whose rates of party membership
were lowest. On the other hand, partici-
pation in union activity was distinctly
more important among the categories
comprising the intellectual elements than

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